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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Sandra Simpson from the grant of 
summary judgment for defendant Kay Jewelers in a suit 
alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. 
SS 621-34 (1985 & Supp. 1997), and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, 
SS 951-63 (1991 & Supp. 1997).1  Simpson contends that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In relevant part, the ADEA provides that 
 
       It shall be unlawful for an employer -- 
 
       (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
       otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
       compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
       because of such individual's age; 
 
       (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
       would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
       opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
       employee, because of such individual's age. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 623(a). In relevant part, the PHRA provides that 
 
       It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any 
       employer because of the . . . age . . . of any individual or 
       independent contractor, to refuse to hire or employ or contract 
with, 
       or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or 
       independent contractor, or to otherwise discriminate against such 
       individual or independent contractor with respect to compensation, 
       hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or 
       contract, if the individual or independent contractor is the best 
able 
       and most competent to perform the services required. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, S 955. 
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evidence of the more favorable treatment of one allegedly 
similarly situated younger employee is sufficient to permit 
the inference that the employer's proffered reason for her 
demotion is a pretext for discrimination. We reject this 
contention and hold that a plaintiff does not create an issue 
of fact merely by selectively choosing a single comparator 
who was allegedly treated more favorably, while ignoring a 
significant group of comparators who were treated equally 
to her. 
 
Simpson also contends that pretext can be inferred from 
alleged inconsistencies between Kay Jewelers' proffered 
reasons and its actions. We also reject this contention and, 
following Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 
F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1993) (pretext turns on the qualifications 
and criteria identified by the employer, not the categories 
the plaintiff considers important), conclude that Simpson 
has not presented evidence sufficient to infer that Kay 
Jewelers' proffered explanations were a pretext for 




Plaintiff, Sandra Simpson, was an employee of Kay 
Jewelers in the DuBois Mall in Clearfield County, 
Pennsylvania. Kay Jewelers was a chain of retail jewelry 
stores, which was purchased by Sterling, Inc. in 1990. 
Simpson was originally hired as a bookkeeper in May, 
1973, and promoted to assistant manager in 1976. She was 
promoted to store manager in 1979, a position she held 
until her demotion in 1994. 
 
From 1991 to 1994, Simpson's forte was her individual 
jewelry sales. The overall store sales, however, were 
considered deficient. Kay Jewelers set sales quotas for each 
of its stores, taking into account such factors as economic 
conditions, mall conditions, and competition. From 
September 1991 to March 1994, Simpson's store satisfied 
its monthly store sales quota eight out of thirty-one 
months. During the fourteen months immediately prior to 
her demotion, it met quota three times. The district 
manager repeatedly indicated on Simpson's evaluations 
that she needed to improve her quota performance and 
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increase store sales.2 The 1991, 1992, and 1994 
evaluations identified increased sales as "major 
developmental needs." The 1993 evaluation stated that 
Simpson needed to "work to get 6/6 [quotas]" and "improve 
[store sales] to min of 103% [of planned sales]." The district 
manager repeatedly identified increased staff training, role 
playing, and staff motivation as necessary to improve 
overall sales. The "action plan for development" in each 
evaluation from 1991 through 1994 listed the need for daily 
staff training and role playing. At least twice, the district 
manager told Simpson she would be demoted if she did not 
meet the store sales quotas. 
 
In March 1993, after Simpson failed to meet sales quotas 
in any of the preceding six months, the district manager 
created a Get It Done list ("GID"), which identified problem 
areas and defined "action plans" to correct the problems. In 
the GID, the district manager stated that Simpson's 
performance in areas other than store sales were basically 
up to standard, but that sales, the most important area, 
was lacking. The district manager concluded that "lack of 
training, direction, staffing, store moral[e], and aggressive 
sales efforts" were the "key reason[s] for the substandard 
sales production." Furthermore, the district manager 
recommended that if "compliance is not obtain[ed] and 
results achieved that [Kay Jewelers] should consider a 
management change (demotion, not termination)." Id. 
 
As part of the GID, Simpson was instructed to maintain 
a sixty-day log of daily training sessions to be held with 
each employee. Simpson testified at her deposition that 
daily training was held, but not with each employee each 
day. She also testified that some, but "not a lot" of role 
playing was conducted. One of Simpson's employees 
testified that she never received training through role 
playing. Another employee testified that role playing was 
not conducted on a daily basis. The store met its sales 
quotas for both months during the sixty-day period. 
However, from the end of the GID period through March 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Simpson had two district managers during the period in question. 
William Miller was district manager through August 1991. Mark Law was 
district manager from August 1991 through March 1994. 
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1994, the store sales quotas were met only once out of the 
ten months. In March 1994, the district manager 
recommended that Simpson be demoted because of her 
unacceptable store sales and continuous failure to train 
and motivate staff to meet sales quotas. The 
recommendation was approved by two Vice Presidents, and 
Simpson was demoted to sales associate at the age of 57. 
Simpson was replaced by Becky Bush, a 42 year old 
woman. 
 
Simpson filed a claim with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in May 1994, alleging 
age discrimination. The EEOC determined there was no 
reasonable cause to believe that there was unlawful 
discrimination. Simpson then filed suit in the district court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania alleging 
discrimination in violation of the ADEA and PHRA. After 
discovery, Kay Jewelers moved for summary judgment. The 
magistrate judge concluded that Simpson had failed to 
make out a case of pretext, and recommended that 
summary judgment be entered for Kay Jewelers. The 
district judge adopted the magistrate judge's report and 
granted Kay Jewelers' motion for summary judgment. This 
timely appeal followed. 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331, 1367. We exercise appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and our review of the district 
court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Ersek v. 
Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1996).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment we 
 
       (i) resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the nonmovant, (ii) do 
not 
       engage in credibility determinations, and (iii) draw all reasonable 
       inferences in favor of the nonmovant. The movant has the burden of 
       pointing out that evidence cognizable in a motion for summary 
       judgment which the movant believes entitles it to summary 
       judgment; the nonmovant must then respond by pointing to 
       sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact 
       concerning every element as to which the nonmoving party will bear 
       the burden of proof at trial. 
 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 




Simpson advances a pretext claim which is perforce 
analyzed under the three steps of the McDonnell Douglas 
line of cases, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981); St. 
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742 
(1993), that we have applied to ADEA cases, see e.g., 
Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 
1995).4 We set forth the familiar McDonnell Douglas 
framework in the margin.5 We will not discuss steps one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It has also been applied to PHRA cases. See Bernard v. Bethenergy 
Mines, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 714, 715 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 31 F.3d 1170 
(3d Cir. 1994); Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Co. v. Commonwealth, 
609 A.2d 804, 805 (Pa. 1992). 
 
5. Under the McDonnell Douglas line of cases, as applied to the ADEA 
and the analogous provision of the PHRA, there are three steps in the 
analysis of pretext discrimination cases. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-25. First, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. at 
2746-47. This is done if she shows that she (1) is a member of the 
protected class, i.e. at least 40 years of age, 29 U.S.C. S 631(a), (2) is 
qualified for the position, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, 
and (4) in the case of a demotion or discharge, was replaced by a 
sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination, 
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Second, upon such a showing by the plaintiff, the burden shifts to the 
employer to produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for the adverse decision. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. at 2747. 
Third, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the employer's 
articulated reason was not the actual reason, but rather a pretext for 
discrimination. Id. at 507; 113 S.Ct. at 2747. 
 
Simpson incorrectly defines the second step as shifting the burden to 
the employer to show that its legitimate reason, alone, would have 
induced the employment decision. Such a burden of showing that the 
same decision would have been made absent discriminatory motives 
applies in Price Waterhouse mixed motive cases, not McDonnell Douglas 
pretext cases. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 276, 109 
S.Ct. 1775, 1805 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Walden v. Georgia- 
Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 
__ 
U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Feb. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1350). See generally Mardell v. 
Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994) 
 
                                6 
  
and two of the framework because although the parties 
contest the district court findings that Simpson established 
a prima facie case of discrimination and that Kay Jewelers 
proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
demotion, we assume arguendo that these steps have been 
satisfied and proceed to step three of the analysis.6 
 
To survive summary judgment when the employer has 
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
action, the plaintiff must 
 
       point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from 
       which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve 
       the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) 
       believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was 
       more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
       cause of the employer's action. 
 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). To 
discredit the employer's articulated reason, the plaintiff 
need not produce evidence that necessarily leads to the 
conclusion that the employer acted for discriminatory 
reasons, Sempier, 45 F.3d at 732, nor produce additional 
evidence beyond her prima facie case, Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
764. The plaintiff must, however, point to "weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(summarizing Price Waterhouse evidentiary scheme), vacated, 514 U.S. 
1034, 115 S.Ct. 1397 (1995), and modified in part, 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 
1995). This case is clearly not a mixed motive case because Simpson has 
pointed to no direct evidence that the "decisionmakers placed substantial 
negative reliance on [age] in reaching their decision." Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. at 1805; Walden, 126 F.3d at 513. Rather, 
Simpson points to evidence from which she claims pretext can be 
inferred. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
6. We note, however, that Simpson's challenge to Kay Jewelers' proffered 
reason is misplaced to the extent she claims that the explanation is 
invalid because there was no evidence that it was the actual reason for 
her demotion. In pretext discrimination cases such as this, "[t]he 
employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its 
behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate 
burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the 
plaintiff." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (emphasis added). 
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reasons [such] that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them `unworthy of credence' " and hence infer that the 
proffered nondiscriminatory reason "did not actually 
motivate" the employer's action. Id. at 764-765 (quoting 
Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531). 
 
To show that discrimination was more likely than not a 
cause for the employer's action, the plaintiff must point to 
evidence with sufficient probative force that a factfinder 
could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that age 
was a motivating or determinative factor in the employment 
decision. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 
1111 (3d Cir. 1997). For example, the plaintiff may show 
that the employer has previously discriminated against her, 
that the employer has discriminated against other persons 
within the plaintiff's protected class or within another 
protected class, or that the employer has treated more 
favorably similarly situated persons not within the 
protected class. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. 
 
Kay Jewelers asserts that Simpson was demoted because 
she repeatedly failed to attain the store sales quotas and 
failed to adequately train and motivate her staff to meet 
quotas. Simpson does not dispute her failure to attain the 
store sales quotas or to adequately train her staff, but does 
make numerous arguments in an attempt to both discredit 
these reasons and show that discrimination was more likely 
than not the motivating cause of her demotion. Simpson 
primarily relies on the fact that Dolly Field, a younger 
manager, was not demoted or fired.7 Simpson argues that 
she and Field were similarly situated because their stores 
were the same size, they were supervised and evaluated by 
the same district manager, and their sales quotas took into 
account the economics of store location.8  Simpson submits 
that her performance was superior to Field's because in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Dolly Field became a store manager in 1991. She was 26 years old at 
the time Simpson was demoted. 
 
8. Kay Jewelers argues that the two stores are not comparable, pointing 
to differences in mall occupancy rates, local competition, and store 
appearance. The district court assumed the stores were comparable. We 
will not address the issue in light of the flaws in Simpson's arguments 
discussed infra. 
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both 1993 and 1994 her evaluation scores for sales were 
higher than Field's and both she and Field received an 
overall rating of "good".9 Simpson then claims that despite 
being evaluated superior to Field, Field was retained as 
manager, while she was demoted; Field was praised, while 
she was criticized; and Field received a higher score in 
"store performance areas," a category Simpson argues is 
directly related to store sales. According to Simpson, this 
evidence of Field's more favorable treatment discredits Kay 
Jewelers' proffered reasons and leads to the inference that 
age discrimination was more likely than not the motivating 
cause of her demotion. Simpson's reliance on Field is 




First, Simpson's reliance on Field is misplaced because 
she cannot selectively choose a comparator. The plaintiff 
has the burden of demonstrating that similarly situated 
persons were treated differently. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 
101 S.Ct. at 1096. The employer's actions are considered in 
light of its actions towards the allegedly more favored 
group, in this case younger managers. Ezold 983 F.2d at 
527; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; 93 S.Ct. at 1825 
(employer may take adverse action, but only if based on 
criteria applied to members of all races). However, the mere 
favorable treatment of one younger manager as compared 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The evaluation forms indicate that Simpson's overall scores were 38.2 
in 1993 and 35.8 in 1994, both equivalent to a "needs improvement" 
rating; whereas Field's scores were 40.3 and 40.5, respectively, both 
equivalent to a "good" rating. However, Simpson alleges that her overall 
scores, based on the unmodified version of her 1993 evaluation and the 
correction of an alleged error in the 1994 evaluation, were "40" in both 
years, equivalent to a "good" rating. The original 1993 evaluation was 
modified when the district manager reduced by two the points given to 
Simpson in the "charge accounts" category. The district manager 
contends that the change was made because he erroneously awarded 
points for performance that was actually below the corporate standard. 
Simpson alleges that the 1994 scoring for sales production was incorrect 
because her 90% performance in store sales versus planned sales should 
have warranted two points within the category and an additional 3.8 
points overall. 
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to one older manager may not be sufficient to infer age 
discrimination. 
 
This is not to say that evidence of the more favorable 
treatment of a single member of a non-protected group is 
never relevant, but rather that the evidence can not be 
viewed in a vacuum. See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 539 (viewing 
record as a whole in finding insufficient evidence that 
plaintiff was treated more severely than her male 
associates); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496-97 
(3d Cir. 1995) (considering evidence that one younger 
manager was treated more favorably despite having 
difficulties similar to plaintiff, where additional evidence 
tended to discredit employer's proffered reason). A decision 
adversely affecting an older employee does not become a 
discriminatory decision merely because one younger 
employee is treated differently. See Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 
940 F.2d 812, 827-28 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff's 
evidence of younger employees benefiting from company 
reorganization insufficient to withstand directed verdict for 
employer). The ultimate inquiry is whether the decision was 
motivated by the affected employee's age. Id. at 827. 
 
We find instructive the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bush 
v. Commonwealth Edison Co. There, the court held that just 
as an employer cannot insulate itself from claims of racial 
discrimination by identifying a token black person whom it 
treated with abnormal leniency, a black plaintiff cannot 
establish racial discrimination by singling out one white 
person who was treated more favorably when there were 
other white persons who were treated less favorably than 
other black persons. 990 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1993). 
"Such a pattern, in which blacks sometimes do better than 
whites and sometimes do worse, being random with respect 
to race, is not evidence of racial discrimination." Id. We 
agree, because to hold otherwise would be to permit the 
inference of discrimination anytime a single member of a 
non-protected group was allegedly treated more favorably 
than one member of the protected group, regardless of how 
many other members of the non-protected group were 
treated equally or less favorably. 
 
Such an inference may be acceptable at the prima facie 
stage of the analysis, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 
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S.Ct. at 1094 (recognizing that plaintiff's burden to 
establish a prima facie case is not "onerous"), where the 
inquiry is based on a few generalized factors, Hicks 509 
U.S. at 516, 113 S.Ct. at 2752, but not necessarily at the 
pretext stage where the factual inquiry into the alleged 
discriminatory motives of the employer has risen to a new 
level of specificity, see id.; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 
S.Ct. at 1095. We recognize, as did the Seventh Circuit in 
Bush, that freedom from discrimination is "an individual 
rather than a group entitlement." Bush, 990 F.2d at 931; 
29 U.S.C. S 623(a)(1) (prohibiting age discrimination against 
any "individual"); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 453-55, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534-35 (1982) (recognizing 
that similar provision in Title VII protects individual 
employee, rather than group). However, there still must be 
evidence from which to infer discrimination apart from the 
fact that some members of one group are sometimes treated 
better and sometimes treated worse than members of 
another group. Bush, 990 F.2d at 931. As stated by the 
district court, the plaintiff can not "pick out one comparator 
who was not demoted amid a sea of persons treated the 
same as her" to establish a jury question. Simpson v. Kay 
Jewelers, No. 95-270J, mem. order at 2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 
1997) (footnote omitted). 
 
Simpson relies solely on Field as a comparator in arguing 
that evidence of less favorable treatment gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination. She does not discuss any of the 
thirty-five other managers who, between 1992 and 1994, 
were demoted to sales associate positions because of their 
store sales performance.10 Of the thirty-five, all were 
younger than Simpson and thirty-four were under the age 
of 40. Thus, even if Simpson was similarly situated to Field 
but treated less favorably, see infra, Simpson's reliance on 
a single member of the non-protected class is insufficient to 
give rise to an inference of discrimination when Simpson 
was treated the same as thirty-four members of the non- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Simpson incorrectly asserts that Kay Jewelers did not present any 
evidence as to the reason for these thirty-five demotions. An affidavit 
submitted by Kay Jewelers and Kay Jewelers' answers to Simpson's 
interrogatories state that the thirty-five persons were demoted because of 
problems with store sales. Simpson presents no evidence to the contrary. 
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protected class. Simply stated, to show that Kay Jewelers' 
proffered reasons were pretext, Simpson can not pick and 
choose a person she perceives is a valid comparator who 
was allegedly treated more favorably, and completely ignore 
a significant group of comparators who were treated equally 




Moreover, even if Field were a proper comparator, 
Simpson's reliance on her would still be misplaced. In 
determining whether similarly situated nonmembers of a 
protected class were treated more favorably than a member 
of the protected class, the focus is on the particular criteria 
or qualifications identified by the employer as the reason 
for the adverse action. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 528. The 
employee's positive performance in another category is not 
relevant, id., and neither is the employee's judgment as to 
the importance of the stated criterion, Healy v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1216 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Furthermore, the court does not subjectively weigh factors 
it considers important. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining 
Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Ezold, 983 
F.2d at 528 (rejecting district court's subjective weighing of 
plaintiff's abilities). Rather, the plaintiff must point to 
evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that 
the plaintiff satisfied the criterion identified by the employer 
or that the employer did not actually rely upon the stated 
criterion. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 767. Compare Brewer, 72 
F.3d at 331-32 (finding that plaintiff's receipt of 
performance bonus raised issue of fact as to whether 
employer's performance-based explanation for discharging 
plaintiff was pretext) with Ezold, 983 F.2d at 528-29 
(finding that plaintiff's abilities in areas other than legal 
analysis not relevant in determining if law firm's legal 
analysis explanation for not promoting plaintiff was 
pretext). 
 
Simpson relies completely on evaluation scores in 
arguing that, as compared to Field, her allegedly superior 
performance but less favorable treatment discredits Kay 
Jewelers' proffered reasons for her demotion. Kay Jewelers, 
however, did not represent that it relied on evaluation 
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scores. Thus, Simpson's view of her performance, as 
measured by evaluation scores, is not relevant. Instead, 
focusing on the stated criterion -- sales quotas-- Field's 
performance was superior to Simpson's, a result Simpson 
does not dispute. Field met or surpassed her quotas six out 
of the fourteen months preceding Simpson's demotion; 
whereas Simpson only met her quotas three out of the 
same fourteen months.11 Accordingly, Simpson's evaluation 






Simpson's other arguments are also inadequate to 
survive summary judgment. Simpson argues that the use of 
sales quotas as the criterion is suspect. She claims that 
using performance on sales quotas is inconsistent with 
evaluation scoring, and points to the fact that despite Field 
having satisfied her sales quota more often than Simpson, 
Field's evaluation scores in all sales criteria were equal to 
or below Simpson's. This, according to Simpson, counsels 
that meeting sales quotas is not determinative of the 
adequacy of a manager's performance. Implicit in this 
argument is the contention that evaluation scores are more 
indicative of performance. Whether sales quotas or 
evaluation scores are a more appropriate measure of a 
manager's performance is not for the court (or factfinder) to 
decide. Healy, 860 F.2d at 1216 ("our inquiry . . . is not an 
independent assessment of how we might evaluate[an] 
employee"). "The question is not whether the employer 
made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We find no significance in Kay Jewelers' use of sales data from March 
1994, the same month Simpson was demoted, in arguing that Field was 
more qualified for the position. Simpson was demoted on or about March 
29 and the decision to demote was made approximately one week earlier. 
Thus, Simpson's March performance was not likely a factor in the 
decision. Nonetheless, if we eliminate March 1994 from the equation, 
Field still performed better than Simpson: Field met her quotas five out 
of thirteen months, whereas Simpson met her quotas three out of 
thirteen months. 
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whether the real reason is [discrimination]." Keller, 130 
F.3d at 1109 (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 
F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in original). 
 
In addition, citing Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986 
(3d Cir. 1997), Simpson claims that this alleged 
inconsistency with evaluation scores raises an inference of 
improper motives. In Bray, we found that various 
discrepancies in how the employer evaluated the criteria 
purportedly relied on to promote a white person over the 
black plaintiff, was sufficient to raise questions of fact as to 
the employer's motives. 110 F.3d at 993-97 (finding 
discrepancies in the timing of employee evaluations, priority 
given to factors in ranking candidates, and interpretation of 
occupational grade levels, all of which were identified as 
reasons for not promoting plaintiff). Bray, however, is 
clearly distinguishable. In Bray the discrepancies were in 
the use of criteria identified as determinative by the 
employer, see id., whereas in this case Simpson is pointing 
to discrepancies between a criterion identified by Kay 
Jewelers (sales quotas) and a criterion asserted only by 
Simpson (evaluation scores). As we have said, the focus is 
on the criteria identified by the employer, not the criteria 




12. Simpson also asserts that the use of sales quotas is suspect because 
some of the store managers purportedly demoted for failure to meet 
quotas were actually "proficient" at meeting their quotas. Simpson points 
to five managers who minimally met their store sales quotas fifty percent 
of the time (ten out of twelve times, five out of seven times, four out of 
six times, seven out of twelve times, and three out of six times). 
Identifying five out of thirty-five persons who performed substantially 
better than Simpson at meeting sales quotas does not reasonably lead to 
the inference that Kay Jewelers did not rely on sales quotas in demoting 
Simpson. The issue is "whether discriminatory animus motivated the 
employer, not whether the employer [was] wise, shrewd, prudent, or 
competent." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. Thus, this alleged contradiction, 
which may raise a question as to the wiseness of demoting those five 
managers, does not give rise to the inference that Kay Jewelers demoted 
Simpson for something other than the asserted nondiscriminatory 
reason. To the contrary, the fact that younger managers with superior 
performance were demoted can be viewed as evidence that age was 
irrelevant. 
 




Simpson argues that the district manager's failure to 
assist in training, and his interference with store 
operations, gives rise to an inference that the district 
manager was seeking to obtain a predetermined result -- 
her demotion -- for discriminatory reasons. Specifically, 
Simpson claims that the district manager failed to conduct 
two two-day training sessions as indicated on the GID,13 
was not helpful when present at the store and on one 
occasion verbally berated the employees such that their 
morale was low, and failed to provide Simpson with the 
discount codes necessary to offer merchandise discounts 
greater than fifteen percent. 
 
To the extent the inference can be made that the district 
manager's behavior impacted the store's sales, the 
evidence, without more, does not rise to such a level that a 
factfinder could reasonably conclude by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Kay Jewelers acted with a discriminatory 
motive. Cf. Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 795 
F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding sufficient evidence to 
uphold jury verdict for plaintiff allegedly discharged for 
substandard performance where evidence led to inference 
that supervisor interfered with employee's efforts, as well as 
that employee performed adequately and employer sought 




Simpson argues that the failure to train explanation is 
inconsistent with Kay Jewelers' actions. She asserts that if 
training had actually been important then the district 
manager would have conducted the training sessions 
pursuant to the GID, and the home office would have sent 
a trainer to the store. Furthermore, Simpson points to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. It is not clear that Simpson is accurately viewing the facts. Simpson 
claims the district manager was to conduct training sessions, however 
the GID only indicates that the district manager was to visit the store, 
which may be interpreted as merely requiring the district manager to 
follow-up on Simpson's efforts at training. Nonetheless, we resolve 
conflicting evidence in favor of Simpson. 
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absence of any further counseling on training after her 
successful completion of the GID. Viewing this evidence in 
the light most favorable to Simpson,14 at most it leads to an 
inference that Kay Jewelers did not consider it important to 
assist Simpson in training her staff; it can not be inferred 
that it was unimportant for Simpson to improve training on 
her own accord. The record is replete with evidence, 
contrary to Simpson's assertion that there is no evidence, 
that Kay Jewelers considered staff training important. From 
1991 to 1994, each of Simpson's evaluations indicated that 
she needed to conduct more training. The GID specifically 
required training to be conducted on a daily basis. 
Accordingly, there is no basis from which to infer that the 
failure to train explanation was "unworthy of credence."15 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. Simpson makes three additional 
arguments, which we find completely without merit.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Simpson contends she successfully completed the GID, but Kay 
Jewelers argues that she did not implement all of the instructions on the 
list. 
 
15. Simpson also claims that Kay Jewelers did not raise the failure to 
train explanation to the EEOC. Kay Jewelers' position statement to the 
EEOC states: 
 
       As a result of the Charging Party's declining performance level and 
       lack of responsive initiative . . . Charging Party was demoted from 
       Store Manager to full-time sales employee . . . based upon Charging 
       Party's failure to improve store sales. . . . [I]t was Charging 
Party's 
       responsibility to maintain . . . the sales of the entire store by 
       training, motivating and managing the store staff. 
 
Appendix at 731a. Even if this statement could be read as not 
specifically indicating that Simpson's failure to train was a reason for 
her 
demotion, it does not make Kay Jewelers' subsequent raising of the 
explanation pretextual. "[T]he mere fact that a defendant relies on a post 
hoc [explanation] does not in and of itself create a factual dispute about 
whether the [explanation was] pretextual." Healy, 860 F.2d at 1215. The 
plaintiff must point to evidence that demonstrates there is reason to 
disbelieve the explanation. Id. at 1215-16; see also McCoy v. WGN 
Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(declining to bind defendants to "positions they initially assert in state 
administrative proceedings by rendering any different position a per se 
pretext"). Simpson has not pointed to any such evidence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Simpson asserts that (1) the district manager's downward revision of 
her evaluation score reflects adversely on Kay Jewelers' veracity; (2) the 
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In sum, Simpson has not provided evidence sufficient to 
discredit Kay Jewelers' proffered reasons or to permit the 
inference that discrimination was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause for her demotion. 
Accordingly, the district court's order granting summary 
judgment to the defendant will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
downward departure in evaluation scores between 1992 and 1993 is 
suspicious; and (3) Kay Jewelers' claim of low store morale due to 
Simpson's alleged "stealing" of associates' sales is a baseless 
accusation. 
As we discussed previously, the focus is on the"qualification[s] the 
employer found lacking." Ezold, 983 F.2d at 528. Kay Jewelers found 
that Simpson was deficient in meeting her store sales quotas and in 
training her staff; Kay Jewelers did not rely on the evaluation scores or 
the alleged stealing. Kay Jewelers indicated that store morale, in 
general, 
was one of several causes for the inadequate store sales. It was not, as 
put forth by Simpson, an alternate reason for the demotion. Thus, 
viewing these claims in the light most favorable to Simpson, the evidence 
does not tend to discredit Kay Jewelers' articulated reasons. 
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POLLAK, District Judge, concurring. 
 
I join the judgment and opinion of the court. 
 
I write separately merely to call attention to a legal 
question unresolved in this circuit that lurks unobtrusively 
in a footnote of the court's opinion. The question is whether 
this circuit's conventional summary of the elements of a 
prima facie ADEA case of discriminatory discharge or 
demotion is too narrowly stated insofar as it appears to 
contemplate that the plaintiff must establish that she has 
actually been replaced by a significantly younger person. 
Because appellant Simpson was in fact replaced by a 
significantly younger person, the question is of no moment 
in the present litigation, and there is, therefore, no present 
need for this court to resolve it. But the question is one 
that is likely to surface in some future ADEA case. So 
flagging the question now may serve to stimulate some 
useful thinking by those interested in this field of law. 
 
In footnote 5 the court outlines the "three steps in the 
analysis of pretext discrimination cases" which must be 
pursued "[u]nder the McDonnell Douglas line of cases, as 
applied to the ADEA and the analogous provision of the 
PHRA." The footnote explains that the first of the three 
steps consists of "establish[ing] a prima facie case of 
discrimination," which a plaintiff accomplishes"by showing 
that she (1) is a member of the protected class, i.e. at least 
40 years of age, 29 U.S.C. S631(a), (2) is qualified for the 
position, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, and 
(4) in the case of a demotion or discharge, was replaced by 
a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age 
discrimination." In support of this four-phase formulation 
of a prima facie ADEA discharge or demotion case footnote 
5 cites Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 
(3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987). The citation 
is an apposite one: in Chipollini, an ADEA discharge case, 
this court set forth essentially the same four-phase 
formulation. 
 
Chipollini, in turn, derived the four-phase formulation 
from Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern., 766 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). In Maxfield this 
court adapted to ADEA discharge cases the Supreme 
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Court's four-phase formulation in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), of a prima facie Title VII case 
of racially discriminatory refusal to hire. Under McDonnell 
Douglas the plaintiff must, as an initial matter, establish: 
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 
411 U.S. at 802. The Maxfield discussion of the elements of 
a prima facie ADEA discharge case dealt with the question 
whether the fourth phase required a showing that the 
complainant had been replaced by a person younger than 
forty -- i.e., a person not within the statutorily protected 
class. This court rejected such a construction of the ADEA: 
"we hold that an ADEA plaintiff may establish the fourth 
element of the McDonnell Douglas test for a prima facie case 
by showing that s/he was replaced by a person sufficiently 
younger to permit an inference of age discrimination." 766 
F.2d at 793. 
 
What should be noted is that what this court was called 
on to decide in Maxfield was whether replacement by a 
significantly younger person within the protected class 
could be regarded as tending to establish a prima facie case 
of discharge contravening the ADEA, and this court's 
answer was in the affirmative. What the Maxfield court was 
not called on to decide -- or at least was not expressly 
called on to decide -- was whether replacement by someone 
significantly younger is an indispensable ingredient of a 
prima facie ADEA discharge case, or whether, in a 
circumstance in which the discharged plaintiff is not 
replaced, other evidence can support a prima facie case. In 
this connection it may be relevant that the Supreme Court 
in McDonnell Douglas did not require, as the fourth phase 
of a prima facie race-based-refusal-to-hire case, that the 
plaintiff establish the hiring of a non-minority person to fill 
the job for which the plaintiff was rejected; rather, the 
Court required the more limited showing that "the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 
411 U.S. at 802. 
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The language from McDonnell Douglas which has just 
been quoted may signify that the Maxfield/Chipollini 
formulation has (inadvertently) been crafted in overly 
narrow terms. But that is not an obligatory inference. Race 
discrimination and age discrimination are sufficiently 
different phenomena so that the elements of Title VII's 
regulatory regime may not be automatically transferable in 
their entirety to the ADEA context. And in the ADEA 
context many cases seem to reflect an expectation that an 
ADEA discharge or demotion plaintiff will show 
replacement, either achieved or anticipated. As the Second 
Circuit put the matter in Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 714 F.2d 
113, 119 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984): "Under the McDonnell Douglas 
formula as applied in ADEA cases a plaintiff may make out 
a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that he 
belongs to the protected group (40 to 70 years of age), that 
he was sufficiently qualified to continue holding his 
position, that he was discharged, and that his position 
thereafter was held by someone younger than himself or 
held open for such a person." On the other hand, the Fifth 
Circuit has said, in Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts,  964 F.2d 1471, 
1478 n.19 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 
(1993): "In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 799, 
802. . . . the Supreme Court formulated an evidentiary 
procedure for race discrimination cases which has been 
adapted for ADEA cases. First the plaintiff must prove a 
prima facie case of age discrimination, which consists of 
evidence that the plaintiff: (1) was discharged; (2) was 
qualified for the position; (3) was within the protected class 
at the time of discharge; (4) was replaced by someone 
outside the protected class; or (5) by someone younger; or 
(6) show otherwise that his discharge was because of age." 
(The Fifth Circuit's Olitsky formulation has its origins in 
Elliot v. Group Medical & Surgical Service, 714 F.2d 556, 
562 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984), a 
Fifth Circuit case referred to by this court in Maxfield. See 
766 F.2d at 792.). 
 
Determining whether the Fifth Circuit is closer to the 
mark than the Second Circuit may be postponed for 
another day, since resolution of the question one way or 
another can have no bearing on the present appeal. As 
noted above, Ms. Simpson was in fact replaced by a 
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significantly younger person, and, accordingly, she was able 
to make out a prima facie case within the letter of Maxfield 
and Chipollini. The weakness of Ms. Simpson's case came at 
a later stage. As the opinion of the court makes plain, the 
magistrate judge and the district court correctly concluded 
that her case on the merits was too insubstantial to survive 
Kay Jeweler's motion for summary judgment. 
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